use got_object_id_hex instead of got_sha1_digest_to_str (where possible) The latter assumes that we only have sha1 digests to pretty-print, while the former could, in the future, automatically switch to sha256. At the moment though, this is a no-op.

make new pkt read timeout apply only to gotsh, not the client-side helpers

remove unneded wbuf->fd = -1 There's no need to set the fd to -1 on ibufs created with imsg_create(3), and it was probably never needed.

convert to use imsg_get_fd() While here also fix a fd leak in got-read-pack. We were dup'ing imsg.fd without closing imsg.fd later; instead just use imsg_get_fd() to extract the file descriptor. Tested by falsifian and Kyle Ackerman, thanks! 'go ahead' stsp@

provide functions to parse/serialize different hashes it abstracts over the hash type and ensures that object ids are zero'ed before their sha1 digest is written. Needed by the incoming sha256 support. ok stsp@

rename lib/sha1.c to lib/hash.c It will soon grow functions to deal with sha256 too. stsp@ agrees.

include sha2.h too where sha1.h is included In preparation for wide sha256 support; stsp@ agrees. Change done mechanically with find . -iname \*.[cy] -exec sam {} + X ,x/<sha1\.h>/i/\n#include <sha2.h>

got_imsg_send_remote_ref: use struct instead of buffer for id ok stsp@

got_imsg_send_ref: use struct instead of buffer for id ok stsp@

got: minor refactor of got_pathlist_free() API Accept flag parameter to optionally specify which pointers to free. This saves callers looping through the list to free pointers. ok + fix stsp@

fix uninitialised fildes variables in libexec helpers Reviewed and uncovered as part of the diff in the forthcoming commit (pathlist API refactor). ok stsp@

always cast ctype' is*() arguments to unsigned char ok stsp@

got send: show server error Print the error message reported by the remote server when failing to update a branch (for e.g. because of a server-side check.) Reported by gonzalo@, with help and ok stsp@.

fix crash in got-send-pack when server does not announce any capabilities

avoid incomplete writes of pack file data in got-send-pack

introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1) This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients. Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here, but this server is not yet expected to be stable. More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions. The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository, which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future. At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository. This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop. At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises: "stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil" The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5). Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd". The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine without such help, because Git repositories can be read without having to create any lock-files. gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access to the gotd(8) socket. To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1). gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection. gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell. At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected from modification). While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal, making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access over ssh(1) is on the road map.

remove trailing whitespace; patch by Josiah Frentsos

fix snprintf error handling follow the "proper secure idiom" described in the CAVEATS section of printf(3). reminded by tb@ and millert@

Do not ignore error from got_pathlist_append. Found by llvm's scan-build (dead store). OK stsp

imsg_add() frees its msg argument on error; avoid double-free in error paths

const-ify tables ok thomas_adam millert

apply time-based rate-limiting to got-send-pack upload progress output

plug memory leaks in got-fetch-pack and got-send-pack ok naddy

whitespace fix from Omar Polo

fix some integers that had a slightly wrong type; patch by Omar Polo