Commits
- Commit:
1eb3899277955a87d80eef900b6ea458ff73bd6c
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
significantly reduce the amount of code linked into gitwrapper
By moving got_serve_parse_command() from lib/serve.c into lib/dial.c
as got_dial_parse_command(), we can significantly reduce the amount
of symbols gitwrapper depends on indirectly.
As a downside, gotsh now needs to link to dial.c. But it only uses the
same parsing routine, and any other routines in dial.c would likely
cause pledge violations in gotsh if used.
No functional change.
- Commit:
53bf0b541977b66862040d4b633fb6b5d3a3c6c8
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
rename lib/sha1.c to lib/hash.c
It will soon grow functions to deal with sha256 too. stsp@ agrees.
- Commit:
b0ac38bb75347d8463628704f64f5ff0349272a6
- From:
- Mark Jamsek <mark@jamsek.dev>
- Date:
fix gotd build
Add missing srcs and update got_repo_read_gitconfig() to be consistent
with recent changes.
ok stsp@
- Commit:
fba1620002c2caadd99d922c5e66e0d3676cfbc1
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
stop installing git-{receive,upload}-pack symlinks to gotsh in ~/bin
Having those links in the user's PATH can make our send/fetch regression
tests fail. We do want to talk to git-daemon during those tests, and these
symlinks can get in the way of that.
- Commit:
bc854c7bc75429b27c69c3d76a040b8c428799ad
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
allow gotsh(1) to be installed as git-receive-pack and git-upload-pack in $PATH
- Commit:
13b2bc374c1870ec27b2eeb40efe68fd465f64bb
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1)
This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute
minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients.
Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here,
but this server is not yet expected to be stable.
More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions.
The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository,
which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future.
At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository.
This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then
fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop.
At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises:
"stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil"
The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way
that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to
restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories
listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5).
Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd".
The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the
repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine
without such help, because Git repositories can be read without
having to create any lock-files.
gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories
on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not
have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access
to the gotd(8) socket.
To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this
secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1).
gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol
towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection.
gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell.
At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to
all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and
the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected
from modification).
While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal,
making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access
over ssh(1) is on the road map.